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Abstract 
Trade Liberalization and Horizontal Merger 
Trade liberalization implies increased international competition between firms and 
increased opportunities for foreign market access. Firms can choose to meet increased 
international competition by merging horizontally, either domestically or cross-border. 
Foreign firms can also choose horizontal merger as a way to access foreign markets.  
In this thesis we analyse theoretically how trade liberalization affects incentives for 
(domestic versus international) mergers and the corresponding welfare implications of 
trade liberalization. The analytical framework is a two-stage model with endogenous 
merger formation among domestic and foreign owners prior to Cournot competition in the 
domestic market. We also assume that there are different sources of cost synergies that can 
be realized through various types of horizontal merger. We find that international mergers 
arise in equilibrium only if trade costs are sufficiently high. On the other hand, the fully 
decentralized market structure (without any mergers) arises only if foreign firms are 
sufficiently more cost efficient that domestic firms. The welfare analysis shows that 
equilibrium market structures and the market structures that maximize domestic welfare do 
not always coincide.  
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Resumo 
Liberalização do Comércio e Fusão Horizontal 
 
A liberalização do comércio implica o aumento da concorrência internacional entre 
empresas e o aumento das oportunidades de acesso ao mercado externo. As empresas 
podem escolher a fusão horizontal ao invés do nível nacional ou internacional para 
enfrentar o aumento da concorrência internacional. As empresas estrangeiras também 
podem escolher fusão horizontal, como forma de acesso aos mercados estrangeiros. 
Nesta tese, iremos analisar teoricamente como a liberalização do negócio afeta os 
incentivos (autóctone versus internacional), as fusões e as implicações sociais 
correspondentes de liberalização do comércio. O quadro analítico é um modelo de dois 
estágios com a formação endógena de fusão entre os proprietários nacionais e estrangeiros 
antes da competição Cournot no mercado doméstico. Assumimos também que existem 
diferentes fontes de sinergias de custos que podem ser realizados através de vários tipos de 
fusão horizontal. Nós achamos que as fusões internacionais surgem em equilíbrio somente 
se os custos de comércio são suficientemente elevados. Por outro lado, a estrutura de 
mercado totalmente descentralizada (sem fusões) surge apenas se as empresas estrangeiras 
forem suficientemente mais eficientes que as empresas nacionais. A análise de bem-estar 
mostra que as estruturas do mercado de equilíbrio e as estruturas de mercado que 
maximizam o bem-estar doméstico nem sempre coincidem.  
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1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization plays an important role in the process of economic globalization. It 
is an inevitable choice for development of international trade, and remains to be the 
mainstream despite the existence of many kinds of trade protectionism. In some sense, 
economic globalization is a procedure of trade and investment liberalization.    
The term of “trade liberalization” has been very common in the economics literature. 
The earliest theoretical research on this concept is probably Bhagwati and Kruger (1973), 
who study trade protectionism of developing countries. The most common interpretation of 
this concept implies a process in which a government gradually reduces administrative 
intervention and relaxes the restrictions on trade, by legislations and international 
agreements, in order to rationalize and optimize the allocation of resources, and capture the 
maximum economic benefit from external trade.          
Hence, we can define trade liberalization as a process in which a country gradually 
reduces the restrictions on (goods or services) imports. It implies that the international 
competition increases and it gives more opportunities for foreign market access because of 
trade cost reductions. As a consequence of trade liberalization, tariff and non-tariff barriers 
are minimized or even abolished, which is also a common aim for both the “General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade” (GATT) and the “World Trade Organization” (WTO). 
The development of the world’s economy presents the trend of globalization, which is 
mostly pushed by the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). In the last twenty years, 
FDI has exceeded both international trade and international technology transfer in terms of 
growth rates. International mergers are characterized as a combination of merger and FDI, 
and are viewed as an efficient way to induce business expansion and enter the international 
market. Recently they accounted for more than 50 percent of FDI (UNCTAD, 2011). 
International mergers mainly take place among firms in developed countries but are also 
extending to developing countries. In other words, international mergers arise in almost all 
economic hotspots and have become an investment vehicle that can be employed by firms. 
UMINHO 2013 
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The most authoritative definition of merger is by “The New Encyclopedia Britannica”: 
“A merger may be treated as either a purchase or a pooling of interests… In a pooling of 
interests, the merged firms are usually about the same size; both managements carry on 
important functions after the merger; and common stock, rather than cash or bonds, is 
used in payment.” It shows that a merger emphasizes restructuring, which is always 
accompanied by transactions of control.  
The strategic coalition is similar to this concept. Yashino and Rangan (1995) define 
three necessary conditions for a strategic coalition: first, two or more firms devote 
themselves to a common objective, and all of them still remain independent inside the 
coalition; second, cooperative firms share gains of the coalition and control characteristic 
business performance, respectively; third, cooperative firms keep making contributions to 
one or more key strategic areas. The strategic coalition, in which members are independent 
and equal to each other, emphasizing cooperation and comprehensive compatibility among 
members, and seeking for a common economic interest and complementary advantages, is a 
“win-win” strategy. In the process of forming a coalition, equity transactions may exist, but 
without control transaction. Therefore, the main distinction between merger and strategic 
coalition is whether control transactions arise. 
This thesis focuses on exploring the effects of trade liberalization on merger incentives. 
Because the control, which is transferred between firms, does not influence this purpose, we 
will ignore the control transaction problem, and never distinguish between merger and 
strategic coalition in the following. Firms can either control other firms by processing equity 
exchanges, or gain higher economic profits and market shares by forming strategic coalition 
with other firms. Regardless of which approach would be chosen, this kind of behavior will 
be regarded as merger in the model analysis. 
The rapid development of economic globalization in the world leads to increased 
market competition, although it also brings more business opportunities for the international 
firms. In this economic context, should a firm participate in an international merger? If yes, 
which incentives induce an international merger? Which kind of policies should authorities 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND HORIZONTAL MERGER 
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introduce in order to safeguard public interests? Do private incentives always coincide 
social ones? How does trade liberalization affect the private and social incentives for 
domestic versus international mergers? 
After defining the concepts of “trade liberalization” and “merger”, we proceed to 
discuss which incentives induce a merger during trade liberalization. We try to build a 
simple model, which includes different cost disadvantages for each country, to examine the 
effects of trade liberalization on merger incentives. In the two-country model, all firms 
compete in the domestic market only. Domestic firms suffer a higher production cost while 
foreign firms must pay trade cost if they plan to enter the market by exporting. Because of 
the explicit assumption that firms never exit the domestic market, trade costs are assumed 
to be below the prohibitive levels. Hence, we consider three possible market structures: (i) 
the (domestic) market is supplied by domestic plants only; (ii) the market is supplied by 
foreign plants only; (iii) the market is supplied by both foreign and domestic plants. 
The aim of this thesis includes three aspects: (i) to show the effects of trade 
liberalization on market structures when countries have different cost disadvantages; (ii) to 
analyze the influences of trade liberalization on merger incentives; (iii) to explore the 
domestic welfare consequences and compare the private and social incentives of trade 
liberalization. In order to achieve this aim, we organize the thesis as follows. We present a 
two-country Cournot oligopoly model in Section 3. Assuming the cost functions are 
different in two countries, if firms engage in an international merger, they can produce 
only in one country to avoid the higher costs (either production costs or trade costs), or 
produce in both countries to reduce losses from diseconomies of scale. 
In Section 4 we derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the following 
two-stage game: In the first stage, firms decide (cooperatively) whether to merge, either 
nationally or internationally, or not. In the second stage, the firms compete 
(non-cooperatively) in the domestic market. We analyze outcomes in each possible market 
structure to make them easy to understand, and then discuss how new firms are formed and 
characterize the equilibrium market structures. We find that international mergers will 
UMINHO 2013 
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arise at medium levels of trade costs if the production cost difference between countries is 
low, and also arise at high trade cost levels if production cost differences are high. This 
finding is significantly different from Calmette (2008), who demonstrated that 
international mergers arise only at low levels of synergies. 
In Section 5 we focus on the effects of trade liberalization on merger incentives, 
consumer surplus, and welfare consequences. In this section we find the following three 
interesting results. First, in the case of low production cost differences we find that 
moderate trade barriers cause international mergers, which is different from the case of 
high production cost differences, where international mergers only arise when barriers are 
high. Second, in the case of low production cost differences, we find that trade 
liberalization reduces social welfare. On the other hand, if production cost differences are 
high, trade liberalization affects social welfare in a non-monotonic way. Third, we find that 
the privately and socially preferred market structures are always different if trade costs are 
close to the difference in production costs. 
Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section 6. 
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2. Literature Review 
In recent decades, topics about merger incentives and welfare effects have become a 
hot issue in economics. The early economics literature mainly focuses on whether the 
merger behavior leads to increased concentration in an industry and whether it affects 
incentives for collusion. Since 1980s, through the development of game theory, however, 
research based on the assumption of non-cooperate game theory became a mainstream 
direction, which mainly focus on the unilateral effect analysis. According to the difference 
of market competition patterns, horizontal merger models can be classified as Cournot 
models, in which all firms produce a homogenous product, and Bertrand models, with 
some level of product differentiation among firms. This thesis will apply the former one to 
explore merger incentives and welfare effects. 
There are large differences between Cournot and Bertrand models. For example, under 
Bertrand competition, firms’ competitive strategies (prices) are strategic complements and 
their response functions are increasing; however under Cournot competition, firms’ 
competitive strategies (quantities) are strategic substitutes and response functions are 
decreasing. Therefore, there are differences between the research conclusions based on 
Bertrand and Cournot models, respectively. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) studied the 
incentives for mergers in a market with differentiated products using a Bertrand model and 
get a reverse result from Salant et.al (1983), who studied merger incentives under Cournot 
competition. 
Salant et al. (1983) analyzed the incentives for horizontal merger by assuming that 
there are N firms competing in Cournot fashion. They conclude that in most cases, firms 
don’t have merger incentives. This model has caused a wave of in-depth study on the 
merger behavior by unilateral effects analysis, and became a basis of follow-up study. 
Nevertheless, it has an obviously imperfection. They assume that the N-1 firms will remain 
symmetrical after the merger, but ignore the asymmetry among firms induced by the 
merger behavior. Perry and Porter (1985) tried to improve this model by applying 
quadratic cost functions and introducing asset factors to express firm size. They found that 
UMINHO 2013 
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in the case of asymmetry, small-sized firms have incentives for horizontal mergers to 
expand their scale since mergers are able to reduce marginal costs and bring economic 
scale effects. This result reversed the conclusion of Salant et al. (1983). Based on Perry 
and Porter’s work, MacAfee and Williams (1992) further studied the impact of merger on 
welfare, and they found that the higher concentration of non-merger assets, the more likely 
the merger improves welfare. Reversely, the merger is harmful to welfare if it generates a 
maximum firm or enlargers the size of the largest firm. 
Not only Salant et al. (1983) but also Perry and Porter (1985) make specific 
assumptions, such as the linear demand function, therefore their conclusions are not 
necessarily universal. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) applied more general demand and cost 
functions, and systematic and comprehensive studied welfare in asymmetric Cournot 
oligopoly markets. They built the model based on two weak assumptions: first, the market 
demand curve slopes downward; second, each firm’s residual demand curve intersects with 
its marginal cost curve. They found that mergers would increase prices in the absence of 
synergy effects. Their study provides sufficient evidence to determine whether horizontal 
mergers improve welfare, or not. Because their conclusion is based on general assumptions, 
it has some universality. However, it is still inadequate, even though it provides a basic 
framework for the follow-up research on horizontal mergers. The follow-up research 
modifies and expands mainly on the following two aspects: 
Firstly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) assumed that all firms compete in Cournot fashion 
after the merger and they do not consider the effect of mergers on firms’ behavior. Because 
mergers are able to reduce the number of firms in the market and for the convenience of 
firms’ collusion, it may improve the incentive for cooperation among firms. Levin (1990) 
relaxed the restriction on the behavior pattern of firms that involved in horizontal mergers 
by using conjectural variation, and based on the assumption that firms always compete in 
Cournot fashion both pre- and post- merger. He demonstrated that in the case with a 
certain level of demand and cost, no matter what behavior chosen by firms, as long as a 
merger leads to an increase in the combined profit of merged firms and their output is less 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND HORIZONTAL MERGER 
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than half of the total industry output, then social welfare must be enhanced. This result 
strengthens the conclusion of Farrell and Shapiro. 
Secondly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) proposed a single-stage static model, which is 
difficult to be used in the long-term effect analysis of mergers. The impact of horizontal 
mergers on profits, welfare, and market structure is a changing dynamic process. In a short 
term, due to the restrictions from some factors (such as production scale), the response 
from the market tends to be very small. In a longer term response to the merger behavior, 
firms excluded from mergers may able to improve their competitive advantage by 
adjusting production scale or technical innovation. Besides the short-term case, Polasky 
and Mason (1998) also took the case of long term into account, where firms have 
opportunities to readjust production scale when their rivals undertake horizontal mergers. 
They introduced a five-stage dynamic game model, and compared the long- and short-term 
merger effects in a homogenous Cournot market. In the short term, horizontal mergers are 
more likely to reduce social welfare due to the restriction of production scale; in the long 
term, horizontal mergers are able to improve social welfare if one of the merged firms has 
lower production efficiency compared to the market level. 
Trade costs and trade liberalization are not the focus in any of the above-mentioned 
studies. Since 1990s, economic globalization and the information technology revolution 
intensified international competition and consequently induced the fifth global wave of 
mergers. More and more economists have turned to focus on the effects trade liberalization 
on merger incentives and welfare from then on. A representative paper is Horn and Persson 
(2001b) who applied a theory of endogenous merger formation to international trade and 
then determined the equilibrium ownership structures in an international oligopoly market, 
showing that low trade costs tend to induce firms to merge internationally and high trade 
costs tend to induce firms to merge domestically. They also demonstrated that private and 
social incentives for mergers tend to differ as long as levels of cost savings and synergies 
are low, but converge if there are more significant synergies. They built a minimal 
symmetric model with two symmetric countries to examine the incentives for mergers, 
UMINHO 2013 
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either international or national. Result shows that the equilibrium pattern of ownership 
depends on production and trade costs.  
This approach was recently employed by Yildiz (2003). In order to overcome the 
non-existence problem1 that arises following trade liberalization, Yildiz assumed that 
firms’ strategic variable is price instead of quantity and came to a similar result that 
contrasts with the intuition of the tariff jumping argument in the FDI literature.  
Comparing with Horn and Persson (2001b)’s cooperate game theory, Rodrigues (2001) 
employed a non-cooperate game to explore incentives for mergers. He assumed that in an 
industry with low concentration, if the anticipated competition is sufficiently strong and 
the cost savings from merger are finite, the non-cooperate endogenous merger has a 
positive effect on social welfare. 
More recently, Calmette (2008) also applied the Horn and Persson (2001b) framework 
to analyze the welfare consequences of trade liberalization with endogenous mergers. She 
demonstrated that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization, but 
trade liberalization is not necessarily pro-competitive in countries with a competitive 
advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. My thesis will be very close to this 
framework. In addition, her efforts on exploring the effect of trade liberalization on merger 
incentives are based on two assumptions. One, trade costs are starting from prohibitive 
levels, which may induce firms to exit. Two, firms compete in both foreign and domestic 
markets. In this thesis, we also employ the framework of Horn and Persson, but relax the 
assumptions that firms compete in both markets and that trade costs are starting from 
prohibitive levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Horn and Persson (2001b) indicated that there is no equilibrium as bilateral trade liberalization occurs, in both Fixed Cost Saving 
Model and Variable Cost Synergies Model.  
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3. The Model Analysis 
Considering a two-country Cournot model with four firms symmetrically locates in 
two countries: D (Domestic) and F (Foreign). These firms are respectively held by four 
owners to produce a homogeneous good, where the production of one product requires one 
unit of an asset. Comparing two countries, country F has a certain level of advantage in 
production costs. More specifically, firms in two countries face different production costs: 
domestic ones need to pay more       per unit of output than foreign ones. Many 
factors can lead to this kind of advantage for country F. It may be due to more excellent 
technology, a lower-tax environment, cheaper labor, etc. Since holding this advantage, 
owners of foreign firms decide to participate in the domestic market competition. 
Assuming the demand is linear. The inverse demand function is given by: 
  
                                                                        (3-1) 
 
where   is the unit price of an indivisible product and   ∑   
 
    is total output.  
Note that in this model, firms will compete in the domestic market only. That is, the 
homogeneous goods are only supplied for the domestic consumers. Those foreign firms 
have three ways to enter the domestic market: first, being a single competitive unit and pay 
a trade cost,      , per unit of goods by exporting these goods to the country D 
directly; second, forming an national coalition (merge with each other) and also export 
their goods directly to country D; third, forming an international coalition with a domestic 
firm to avoid part (produce in both plants) or even all (produce only in the domestic plant) 
of trade costs but endure a higher production cost, or to exterminate the domestic firm 
(produce in the foreign plant only). Note that the trade cost,  , is not explicitly specified 
what it includes. In fact, it may refer to market accessibility, tariff or non-tariff trade 
barriers, transport and distribution costs, etc. Hence, the ultimate size of trade cost depends 
on many elements even though a trade liberalization agreement can reduce it by removing 
tariff or non-tariff trade barriers between two countries.        
UMINHO 2013 
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Domestic firms also have three options: first, remaining as a single competitive unit; 
second, forming a national merger (merge with each other); third, forming international 
mergers (merge with a foreign firm). Similarly, domestic owners face a trade-off among 
trade costs saving, production costs saving, and scale economies effect if they decide to 
take part in an international merger. They can serve the domestic market by producing only 
in the domestic plant and avoiding trade costs, or by producing only in the foreign plant 
and avoiding high production costs but paying trade costs, or by producing in both plants 
(domestic and foreign). 
 
3.1. Cost Function 
The total cost is described as the overall cost of production in a period. In general, the 
total cost can be divided into two kinds: long-run cost and short-run cost. In the short term, 
some input factors, such as plants and machinery, are fixed. Moreover, input factors have 
the feature of indivisibility. Therefore, the production scale of a firm is limited in the short 
term. They need to produce in the minimal cost level under the scale limitation. In the long 
term, firms are able to adjust their production scale by changing all input factors, and then 
minimize the overall cost. It results that in the allowable market capacity, firms are able to 
choose an optimal production scale in which the long-run total cost is minimized and the 
profit is maximized. 
In this model, we interpret the cost function as reflecting long-term costs, where firms 
can maximize their profits by adjusting their production scale. For simplicity, the cost 
functions of firms are assumed as quadratic functions, which are given by: 
 
  (  )  (  )
                                            (3-2) 
 
and 
  (  )  (  )
 
                                                 (3-3) 
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3.2.  Production Strategies 
In this model, merged firms may have three cost saving strategies. First, 
internationally merged firms may allocate all their production in the foreign plant and 
serve the domestic market only by exporting. This strategy is called “production cost 
saving (PCS)”. Second, by producing in the domestic plant only and serving the market 
directly, an internationally merged firm can avoid trade costs. This strategy is called “trade 
cost saving (TCS)”. Finally, by producing at all available plants, merged firms can achieve 
some cost synergies due to reduced diseconomies of scale. This will be referred to as a 
“scale economies effect (SEE)” strategy. 
 
3.2.1. Production Cost Saving 
Calmette (2008) describes the “production cost saving” as: firms who are participating 
in international mergers can avoid high production costs by choosing to produce only in 
the foreign country and exporting to the domestic market. When trade costs are high 
compared to the difference in production costs between two countries, i.e.    , owners 
of an international firm prefer to get some savings from production cost by paying more 
trade cost. The optimal option for the merged firm may therefore be to shut down its 
domestic plant. Note that before owners make production decisions, they need to consider 
whether the gain from a composite effect, by taking a weighted average of the saving on 
production cost and the losing on trade cost, is higher or lower than the one from the scale 
economies effect.   
 
3.2.2. Trade Cost Saving 
Having a certain level of production advantage in the foreign country is an inducement 
that stimulates foreign firms to join the competition in the domestic market. There are 
UMINHO 2013 
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many drivers that may induce foreign firms to cooperate with a domestic firm. Those 
drivers may include eliminating competition, avoiding high trade barriers, seizing more 
market shares, or a combination of all those things. Taking the case of high trade barriers, 
which protect domestic firms, owners of international firms may prefer to produce in their 
domestic plants in order to save trade costs. Of course, those international firms’ owners 
will be facing higher production costs. 
 
3.2.3. Scale Economies Effect 
In our model, we assume that there are plant-specific diseconomies of scale for each 
firm at the initial stage. Firms are able to enjoy scale economies effects by increasing the 
number of available plants, i.e., to participate in a merger (either internationally or 
nationally). 
Diseconomies of scale refer to the effect that plant’s average cost raises as its 
production increases. This effect may be caused by many factors, such as more 
complicated internal organization as the scale of production increases, which may consume 
internal resources to an increasing degree. With an increasing scale of production, the plant 
should set up complex management layers, and design numerous incentives and 
monitoring mechanisms, which will inevitably increase the number of non-production 
employees and devices, resulting in higher costs.  
Apparently, first two production strategies are unavailable for firms that engage in a 
national merger, who are only able to get cost synergies by executing the last strategy. 
Achieving a scale economies effect is also an incentive to undertake a national merger. 
Note that if nationally merged firms decide to choose the strategy of SEE their production 
will be evenly arranged in two plants, irrespective of the values of   and  .2 
In terms of international firms, however, they can adjust their production strategy 
                                                        
2 For instance, if two domestic firms engage in a national merger, the total cost of the merged firm is given by:   (     )
  
 (     ) if produces in one plant only, and     
    
   (     ) if it produces at both plants. It is straightforward to see that 
the total cost function is a strictly convex function, 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑞2
 2   . Due to symmetry, the same analysis will apply for the foreign merger.  
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depending on the variations of   and  . In different ranges of (   ), their incentives for 
cost savings are diverse, so they need to make a trade-off among three strategies and then 
choose the optimal one. A more detailed analysis on making this trade-off will be shown in 
Section 4.2.1. 
 
3.3. Two-Stage Interaction 
The interaction occurs in two stages. In the first stage, owners make decision to merge 
(internationally or domestically) or remain as single competitive units, and then form an 
equilibrium market structure (henceforth EMS). These decisions are assumed to be made 
cooperatively and the merger formation process is represented as a cooperative game of 
coalition-making. 
In the second stage, firms formed in the first stage compete in non-cooperate Cournot 
fashion in the domestic market. We assume that all firms are profit maximizers. Thus, we 
will evaluate their equilibrium profits for each possible structure which may arise in the 
second stage, and then discuss the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ behavior in the 
first stage. We will also evaluate consumer surplus and national (domestic) welfare when 
calculating each equilibrium point of market structures.  
In the merger formation process, we make two basic assumptions on payoff 
distribution. Any payments across coalitions are forbidden, and firms who participate in a 
merger can choose any distribution ratio inside the coalition but the sum of distributed 
payoff must be equal to the formed coalition’s total profit that is received in the second 
stage. And for an internationally merged firm, owners should make an optimal trade-off 
among PCS, TCS and SEE, which affects the merged firm’s production distribution. 
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4. The Subgame Perfect Cournot Nash Equilibrium 
We solve the game by backwards induction, analyzing first the second stage before 
turning to the first stage of the game. 
4.1. Stage 2: Competition in The Domestic Market 
In this section, we will specify the equilibria of all feasible structures, which constitute 
the basis for evaluating the EMS. Considering the restrictions from antitrust legislation, 
highly concentrated market structures are excluded. More specifically, we only allow for 
two-firm mergers. Thus, an international merger including four firms, {1234}, or one 
including three firms, for example, {123,4} or {1,234}, are not permitted. This restriction 
leaves us with 6 feasible market structures that are, respectively, superscripted with “0”, 
“D”, “F”, “N”, “T”, and “I”:  
1. The fully decentralized market structure (no mergers):    ={1, 2, 3, 4}; 
2. The domestic triopoly market structure (only domestic merger):   ={12, 3, 4}; 
3. The foreign triopoly market structure (only foreign merger):   ={1, 2, 34}; 
4. The national duopoly market structure (two national mergers):   ={12, 34}; 
5. The international triopoly market structure (only one international merger):    
={13, 2, 4}, or {14, 2, 3}, or {1, 4, 23}, or {1, 3, 24}; 
6. The international duopoly market structure (two international mergers):   ={13, 
24}, or {14, 23}.  
 
4.1.1. The decentralized market structure 
In this structure all owners of firms decide to remain as single competitive units, i.e. 
no mergers occur among firms. Both foreign firms choose the way of exporting goods 
directly to the domestic market and paying trade costs, while domestic firms do not process 
any response measures. In the decentralized market, each firm chooses its quantity to 
maximize the profit, taking other firms’ quantities as given: 
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      (   )     (  )
            2                          (4-1) 
and 
      (   )     (  )
                                      (4-2)  
 
The first-order conditions are given by: 
 
𝜕  
𝜕𝑞 
               2                                        (4-3) 
𝜕  
𝜕𝑞 
                                                        (4-4) 
  
Solving these FOCs yields the following equilibrium quantities (  ), price ( ), and 
profits (  ), which are superscripted with “0”: 
  
    
  
 
  
(     2 )                                          (4-5) 
  
    
  
 
  
(  2    )                                          (4-6) 
   
 
 
(  2  2 )                                               (4-7) 
  
    
  
 
   
,  (   )   2(   )  2 (   ) -                  (4-8) 
  
    
  
 
   
,  (   )   2(   )  2 (   ) -                  (4-9) 
  
Following the standard concept of total national surplus, the social welfare (𝑊 ) is 
evaluated as the sum of consumer surplus ( 𝑆 ) and profits of domestic firms3: 
 𝑆  
(    )2
 
 
 
  
(2     )                                       (4-10) 
𝑊   𝑆  ∑   
  
    
 
   
,  (   )   (   )    (   ) -        (4-11) 
 
Equilibrium existence requires that output from domestic firms is non-negative: 
                                                        
3 We have assumed that firms compete in the domestic market only. Thus, we will focus on the domestic welfare when we 
analyze the welfare consequences of trade liberalization. The following welfare analysis will exclude profits generated at foreign 
plants. 
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Figure 1: Fully Decentralized Market Structure 
 
  
           
 
 
  
 
 
                                          (4-12) 
 
Similarly, for each foreign firms, rational output is positive if  
 
  
           
 
 
  
 
 
                                          (4-13) 
Notice that:       for all  ∈ (   ).  
Thus, in this market structure the equilibrium exists for the parameter set        , 
which is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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4.1.2. The domestic triopoly market structure 
The aggregate profits of a coalition can be divided in any proportion among owners. 
Any costs from forming the coalition are excluded in this model. When domestic firms 
decide to form a national coalition, we have an asymmetric triopoly.  
The merged firm is denoted by “m”, and its profit is the sum of two plants’ profits. The 
profit maximization problems are given by: 
 
     𝑚  (   )   (     )–   (  )    (  )                       (4-14) 
       (   )       (  )                                      (4-15) 
 
For the merged firm, the optimal output in each plant is determined by its partial 
derivative of the aggregate profit. For the merged firm, the first-order conditions are given 
by: 
𝜕 𝑚
𝜕𝑞 
          𝑘      𝑘 ≠     2                           (4-16) 
 
and the first-order conditions of foreign firms are given by: 
 
𝜕  
𝜕𝑞 
                                                      (4-17) 
 
Solving the above first-order conditions yields the following candidate equilibrium 
variables, which are superscripted with “D”: 
 
  
    
  
 
 6
(     2 )                                         (4-18) 
  
    
  
 
  
(2      )                                          (4-19) 
   
 
  
(       )                                              (4-20) 
 𝑚
  
 
  8
(     2 )                                             (4-21) 
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 6 
(2      )                                         (4-22) 
 
In this scenario, the national welfare is evaluated as the sum of consumer surplus and 
aggregate profit of the merged firm (denoted as “ 𝑚
 ”): 
 
 𝑆  
(   𝐷)2
 
 
 
  8
(7       )                                    (4-23) 
𝑊   𝑆   𝑚
  
 
 6 
,  (   )   (   )  9(   ) -             (4-24) 
 
For the merged firm, rational output is positive if  𝑚
    
    
                                           
For each foreign firm, rational output is positive if  
 
  
           
 
 
  
 
 
                                          (4-25) 
 
Figure 2: Domestic Triopoly Market Structure 
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Notice that       for all  ∈ (   ). 
Thus, in this market structure the equilibrium exists for the parameter set        , 
which illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
4.1.3. The foreign triopoly market structure 
The alternative national triopoly structure is one with a foreign merger between firm 3 
and 4, whereas domestic firms 1 and 2 remain as single competitive units. Similarly, the 
foreign merged firm’s profit is equal to the total profit of two plants. The profit 
maximization problems are given by: 
 
       (   )       (  )           2                          (4-26) 
     𝑚  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                       (4-27) 
 
First-order conditions of domestic firms are given by: 
 
𝜕  
𝜕𝑞 
                 2                                    (4-28) 
 
and the first-order conditions for the merged (foreign) firm are: 
 
𝜕 𝑚
𝜕𝑞3
                                                      (4-29) 
𝜕 𝑚
𝜕𝑞4
                                                      (4-30) 
 
Solving above first-order conditions yields equilibrium outputs (  ), price ( ), and 
profits (  ), which are superscripted with “F” (and merged firm is denoted with “m”): 
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(2      )                                          (4-31) 
  
    
  
 
 6
(  2    )                                         (4-32) 
   
 
  
(       )                                              (4-33) 
  
    
  
 
 6 
(2      )                                         (4-34) 
 𝑚
  
 
  8
(  2    )                                             (4-35) 
Consumer surplus and domestic national welfare are given by: 
 
 𝑆  
(   𝐹)2
 
 
 
  8
(7       )                                    (4-36) 
𝑊   𝑆    
    
  
 
  8
,7 (   )   (   )   2(   ) -        (4-37) 
 
For domestic firms, rational outputs are positive if 
 
  
              2                                          (4-38) 
 
For the merged firm, rational output is positive if  
 
 𝑚
    
    
           
 
 
  
 
 
                                (4-39) 
 
Notice that:       for all  ∈ (   ).  
Thus, in this market structure the equilibrium exists for the parameter set        , 
which is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Foreign Triopoly Market Structure 
 
4.1.4. The national duopoly market structure 
The national duopoly structure is the last one that involves national mergers, in this 
case both foreign and domestic national merger. We mark this structure as “  , and the 
domestic merged firm is denoted with “d” and the foreign merged firm is denoted with “f”. 
In this scenario, plants of each firm are located in the same country. Therefore, firms are 
able to get some cost savings from the scale economies effect by participating in national 
mergers. Their profit maximization problems are given by: 
 
     𝑑  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                       (4-40) 
     𝑓  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                       (4-41) 
  
The first-order conditions are: 
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𝜕 𝑑
𝜕𝑞1
                                                     (4-42) 
𝜕 𝑑
𝜕𝑞2
                                                     (4-43) 
𝜕 𝑓
𝜕𝑞3
                                                     (4-44) 
𝜕 𝑓
𝜕𝑞4
                                                     (4-45) 
 
Superscripting equilibrium quantities (  ), price ( ), and profits (   ) with “N”, the 
solution to the above first-order conditions is: 
 
  
    
  
 
 6
(2      )                                          (4-46) 
  
    
  
 
 6
(2      )                                          (4-47) 
   
 
 
(2     )                                                 (4-48) 
 𝑑
  
 
  8
(2      )                                              (4-49) 
 𝑓
  
 
  8
(2      )                                              (4-50) 
 
Consumer surplus and national welfare are then given by: 
 
 𝑆  
 
  
(2     )                                               (4-51) 
𝑊   𝑆   𝑑
  
 
  8
,2 (   )  2(   )   (   ) -             (4-52) 
 
For the domestic merged firm, rational output is positive if 
 
  
              2     2                                   (4-53) 
  
Similarly, for the foreign merged firm, rational output is positive if  
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Figure 4: National Duopoly Market Structure 
 
  
           
 
 
  
 
 
                                         (4-54) 
 
Notice that       for all  ∈ (   ).  
Thus, in this market structure the equilibrium exists for the parameter set        , 
which is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
4.1.5. The international triopoly market structure 
For firms that willing to engage in international mergers, their owners always have 
incentives to reduce their costs and then obtain higher profits. In order to achieve this goal, 
they need to choose an optimal production distribution plan between plants, which are 
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locates in different countries. The internationally merged firm has three alternative 
production strategies to choose from: PCS, TCS, and SEE. According this, we can separate 
the international triopoly market structure into three sub-structures that are denoted as: 
  𝑓       𝑑. And the international duopoly market structure also can be separated into 
three sub-structures:   𝑑    𝑓    . 
Now, let’s turn attention to the international triopoly structure with one international 
merger. There are 4 different ownership structures that correspond to this market structure: 
*   2  +, *   2  +, *2     +, and *2     +. Due to symmetry, these four ownership 
structures are completely equivalent and we only need to consider one of them. Thus, we 
assume that the merger is formed between firm 1 and 3 here. 
 
(i) International triopoly with a scale economies effect 
 
First, assume that the international firm decides to produce in both plants, which 
means that the firm produces partly in the domestic plant and serves the market directly, 
and another part of output is served to the market by exporting. The incentive for this firm 
to keep producing in both plants is the scale economies effect.   
In the post-merger game, the profit maximization problems are given by: 
 
 𝑚  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                           (4-55) 
   (   )       (  )                                          (4-56) 
   (   )       (  )                                          (4-57) 
 
Consider that the international firm has two plants, which are located in different 
countries. Thus, the firm can decide the optimal outputs of two plants by partial derivative 
of its aggregate profits with respect to each plant’s quantity. The first-order conditions are 
therefore:  
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𝜕 𝑚
𝜕𝑞1
                                                    (4-58) 
𝜕 𝑚
𝜕𝑞3
                                                    (4-59) 
 
The first-order conditions of the firms that do not merge are given by: 
 
𝜕 2
𝜕𝑞2
                                                      (4-60) 
𝜕 4
𝜕𝑞4
                                                      (4-61) 
 
Solving the first-order conditions yields the following candidate equilibrium variables, 
which are superscripted with “T”:  
 
  
  
 
 6
(       )                                              (4-62) 
  
  
 
 8
( 2   9  7 )                                            (4-63) 
  
  
 
 6
(       )                                              (4-64) 
  
  
 
 8
( 2  7   9 )                                            (4-65) 
   
 
 6
( 2  7  7 )                                             (4-66) 
 𝑚
  
 
6 6
,27(   )  27(   )  7 (   ) -                      (4-67) 
  
  
 
    
,   (   )    (   )  7 (   )  -                    (4-68) 
  
  
 
    
 ,   (   )     (   )  7 (   ) -                   (4-69) 
  
  
 
    
( 2   9  7 )     
  
 
    
( 2  7   9 )                 (4-70) 
 
Following the standard concept of national welfare, the national welfare is evaluated 
as the sum of consumer surplus (CS ) and profit of the domestic firm plus the part of the 
international firm’s profits which is received by its domestic owners. However, we don’t 
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know what proportion of the aggregate profit will be distributed to domestic owners. 
Therefore we assume that domestic owners will receive the part that is generated at the 
domestic plant.  
 
 𝑆  
(   𝑇)2
 
 
  
    
(2     )                                     (4-71) 
𝑊   𝑆    
    
  
       
 
   68
,27 9(   )   7(   )  7  (   ) -                 (4-72)      
 
For the international firm, optimal output at the domestic plant is positive if  
 
  
           
8
 
  
 
 
                                         (4-73) 
 
While optimal output at the foreign plant is positive if 
 
  
           
 
8
  
 
8
                                          (4-74) 
 
Notice that       for all  ∈  (   ). 
Thus, the equilibrium exists for the parameter set of        . It is straightforward 
to see that   
    and   
    if        . For this parameter set, the international 
firm can yield the largest cost synergies through the scale economies effect.  
 
(ii) International triopoly with production cost savings 
 
In this case the international firm is willing to incur trade cost in order to obtain 
production cost savings by locating all production to the low-cost (foreign) country. This 
means that the merged firm’s output is zero in its domestic plant (  
   ) and the domestic 
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market is served market by exports only. Thus, profit functions are given by: 
 
 𝑚
 𝑓  (    𝑓)   𝑚
 𝑓    ( 𝑚
 𝑓)                                     (4-75) 
  
 𝑓  (    𝑓)    
 𝑓    (  
 𝑓)                                    (4-76) 
  
 𝑓  (    𝑓)    
 𝑓    (  
 𝑓)                                     (4-77) 
 
Solving the profit maximization problems by FOCs yields equilibrium quantities (  
 𝑓), 
price (  𝑓), and profits (  
 𝑓) that are given by: 
 
 𝑚
 𝑓  
 
 8
(      )                                              (4-78) 
  
 𝑓  
 
 8
(     2 )                                             (4-79) 
  
 𝑓  
 
 8
(      )                                              (4-80) 
  𝑓  
 
6
(    2 )                                               (4-81) 
 𝑚
 𝑓  
 
 6 
(      )                                             (4-82) 
  
 𝑓  
 
 6 
(     2 )                                            (4-83) 
  
 𝑓  
 
 6 
(      )                                             (4-84) 
 
Since the international firm’s domestic plant is closed, the national welfare is counted 
as the sum of consumer surplus ( 𝑆 𝑓) and profit of the domestic firm4. The first two 
variables are given by:  
 
                                                        
4 In this case, foreign firms have comparatively high competitive advantage. Hence, in the international coalition, the foreign owner 
holds a larger bargaining power and the domestic owner will receive very little part of profits. For the purpose of simplifying, total 
profits of the international firm is excluded in the calculation of national welfare. It also applies for the TCS case of the international 
duopoly. However, for the PCS case, in both the international duopoly and triopoly we should take total profits into account when 
calculating national welfare.  
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 𝑆 𝑓  
(   𝑇𝑓)
2
 
 
 
  
(    2 )                                    (4-85) 
𝑊 𝑓   𝑆 𝑓    
 𝑓  
 
6 8
, 7(   )    (   )  22(   ) -         (4-86) 
 
We see that   
 𝑓    if        
 
 
  
 
 
, and  𝑚
 𝑓    if        
 
 
  
 
 
. 
Notice that             for all  ∈  (   ). 
 
(iii) International triopoly with trade cost savings 
 
If the international firm is in pursuit of trade cost savings, the firm’s owners decide to 
distribute their production in the domestic plant only and serve the market from local 
production. By this way, they should incur a higher production cost. Then profit functions 
are given by: 
 
 𝑚  (   )   𝑚    ( 𝑚)                                        (4-87) 
   (   )     CD(  )                                          (4-88) 
   (   )     CF(  )                                          (4-89) 
 
Solving these profits functions’ FOCs yields equilibrium quantities (  ), price ( ), and 
profits (  ), which are listed as follows: 
 
 𝑚
 𝑑  
 
 8
(      )                                              (4-90) 
  
 𝑑  
 
 8
(      )                                              (4-91) 
q 
Td  
 
 8
(  2d   f)                                              (4-92) 
  𝑑  
 
6
(  2   )                                               (4-93) 
 𝑚
 𝑑  
 
 6 
(      )                                             (4-94) 
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 𝑑  
 
 6 
(      )                                             (4-95) 
  
 𝑑  
 
 6 
(  2    )                                            (4-96) 
 
In this case, the international firm allocates their production entirely in their domestic 
plant. Thus, the national welfare needs to account total profit of this firm. Then, consumer 
surplus and national welfare are given by: 
 
 𝑆 𝑑  
(   𝑇𝑑)2
 
 
 
  
(  2   )                                    (4-97) 
𝑊 𝑑   𝑆 𝑑   𝑚
 𝑑    
 𝑑  
 
6 8
,  (   )  7(   )   (   ) -.     (4-98) 
 
 
Figure 5: International Triopoly Market Structure 
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We see that   
 𝑑    if        
 
 
  
 
 
, and  𝑚
 𝑑    if            . 
Notice that:              for all  ∈  (   ). 
 
Proposition 1. In the international triopoly market structure, the preferred strategy for the 
international firm is: 
(1) TCS, if        . 
(2) SEE, if        . 
(3) PCS, if        . 
Intuitively, when the trade cost is sufficiently high but still not above the prohibitive 
level (i.e.,        ), an international firm will shut down its foreign plant and give up 
possible gains from scale economies effect in order to avoid the higher trade cost. On the 
other hand, if the production cost difference is very large (i.e.,        ), the 
international firm will rearrange its production to the foreign plant and forego the lower 
marginal cost that obtained by the scale economies effect. Moreover, if two parameter 
values are sufficiently close, i.e.,        , the scale economies effect will become 
more prominent as a source of cost synergy than the other two cost saving strategies. 
 
4.1.6. The international duopoly market structure 
Another structure with international mergers is denoted as “  ”, which consists of two 
international mergers. In other words, all firms are involved in international mergers, and 
ultimately forming a symmetric duopoly. If owners decide to join an international merger, 
choosing which firm to be their partner is random. Certainly, their partner should be 
located in another country. Therefore, there are two homogeneous structures, *   2 + and 
*   2 +. We know that in a structure which has one or two international mergers, there 
exists a trade-off among cost saving (or synergy) strategies. Hence, here we still divide the 
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market structure analysis into three parts. 
 
(i) International duopoly with a scale economies effect 
 
Initially we assume that internationally merged firms produce in both plants. Therefore, 
their profit maximization problem is given by: 
 
     𝑚  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                      (4-99) 
     𝑚  (   )  (     )    (  )    (  )                     (4-100) 
 
Then, first-order conditions are given by: 
 
𝜕 𝑚1
𝜕𝑞1
                                                  (4-101) 
𝜕 𝑚1
𝜕𝑞3
                                                  (4-102) 
𝜕 𝑚2
𝜕𝑞2
                                                  (4-103) 
𝜕 𝑚2
𝜕𝑞4
                                                  (4-104) 
 
Solving the FOCs yields equilibrium variables as follows, which are superscripted 
with “I”: 
 
  
    
  
 
 6
(2       )                                         (4-105) 
  
    
  
 
 6
(2       )                                         (4-106) 
   
 
 
(2     )                                                (4-107) 
  
    
  
 
  6
,22(   )    (   )    (   ) -                 (4-108) 
  
    
  
 
  6
,   (   )  22(   )    (   ) -                (4-109) 
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 𝑚 
   𝑚 
  
 
  8
, (   )   (   )    (   ) -                 (4-110) 
 
The corresponding consumer surplus ( 𝑆 ) and national welfare (𝑊 ) are given by: 
 
 𝑆  
(   𝐼)
2
 
 
 
  
(2     )                                      (4-111) 
𝑊   𝑆    
    
  
 
  8
,  (   )  2(   )  9(   ) -.        (4-112) 
 
Having assumed that international firms hold all plants’ productions, therefore outputs 
at domestic plants should be subject to  
 
  
    and    
         ≔
 
 
  
 
 
                               (4-113) 
 
while outputs at foreign plants should be subject to 
 
  
    and   
         ≔
 
 
  
 
 
.                              (4-114) 
 
Hence, international firms will optimally pursue the scale economies effect only in the 
parameter range        . 
 
(ii) International duopoly with production cost savings  
 
Now let's turn to the case of production cost savings. In this case, both international 
firms shut down their domestic plants and only serve the market by exporting, implying 
that outputs of domestic plants are zero. Note that in this structure, the two international 
firms are symmetric, so their profit maximization problem is given by: 
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     𝑚  (   )   𝑚    ( 𝑚 )     2                           (4-115) 
 
The first-order conditions are 
 
𝜕 𝑚 
𝜕𝑞𝑚 
       𝑚          2                                (4-116) 
 
Solving the FOCs yields equilibrium outputs (  
 𝑓), price (  𝑓), and profits (  
 𝑓), 
which are superscripted with “𝐼 ”: 
 
 𝑚 
 𝑓   𝑚 
 𝑓  
 
 
(   )                                             (4-117) 
  𝑓  
 
 
(  2 )                                                  (4-118) 
 𝑚 
 𝑓   𝑚 
 𝑓  
 
  
(   )                                            (4-119) 
 
In this scenario, domestic plants have zero output. Therefore, national welfare (𝑊 𝑓) in 
the domestic country is equal to consumer surplus ( 𝑆 𝑓). 
 
𝑊 𝑓   𝑆 𝑓  
(   𝐼𝑓)2
 
 
 
  
(   )                                   (4-120) 
 
It is straightforward to see that firms’ outputs are always being positive for all 
 ∈  (   ). 
 
(iii) International duopoly with trade cost savings 
 
The last scenario is when international firms pursue trade cost savings by serving the 
market from production at domestic plants only. This implies that output at foreign plants 
is zero. Hence, their profit maximization problem is given by: 
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     𝑚  (  Q)   𝑚  CF( 𝑚 )     2                           (4-121) 
 
First-order conditions are given by: 
 
∂ 𝑚 
∂𝑞𝑚 
   Q    𝑚  d     2                                    (4-122) 
 
Solving the FOCs yields equilibrium outputs ( 𝑚 ), price ( ), and profits ( 𝑚 ), which 
are superscripted with “𝐼 ”: 
 
 𝑚 
 𝑑   𝑚 
 𝑑  
 
 
(   )                                             (4-123) 
  𝑑  
 
 
(  2 )                                                  (4-124) 
 𝑚 
 𝑑   𝑚 
 𝑑  
 
  
(   )                                            (4-125) 
 
Thus, the national welfare (𝑊 𝑑) equals consumer surplus ( 𝑆 𝑑) plus aggregate 
profits of two international firms:  
 
 𝑆 𝑑  
(   𝐼𝑑)
2
 
 
 
  
(   )                                        (4-126) 
𝑊 𝑑   𝑆 𝑑   𝑚 
 𝑑   𝑚 
 𝑑  
6
  
(   ) .                              (4-127) 
 
It is straightforward to see that firms’ outputs are always being positive for all 
 ∈  (   ). 
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Figure 6: International Duopoly Market Structure 
 
Proposition 2. In the international duopoly market structure, the preferred strategy for 
international firms is: 
(1) TCS, if      . 
(2) SEE, if        . 
(3) PCS, if      . 
Proposition 2 is graphically illustrated in Figure 6. The top curve is   , while the 
bottom curve is   . Starting from     until   reaches   , international firms are 
facing such high trade cost that they choose to serve the market directly by producing only 
at domestic plants. At levels of   lower than   , the firms optimally use plants in both 
countries to serve the domestic market, because the trade cost level is so close to the 
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production cost difference that cost savings from either PCS or TCS strategy is less than 
the cost synergy obtained by SEE. At   below   , firms are able to profit more from the 
PCS strategy and will consequently produce only in foreign plants and serve the domestic 
market exclusively by exports.  
 
4.1.7. Summary 
 
Figure 7: Upper and Lower Bounds of Possible Market Structures 
 
For all candidate equilibrium market structures, their feasible regions are different. All 
the feasible regions of the candidate equilibrium structures are summarized in Table 1, 
with all boundaries graphically illustrated in Figure 7. Observing Table 1, we can find an 
interesting phenomenon. For a given type of merger (either international or national), a 
more concentrated market structure is consistent with a larger feasible parameter region. 
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Table 1: Parameter Set of Each Possible Market Structure 
            
            
            
            
  𝑑          
            
  𝑓           
 
  𝑑       
             
  𝑓       
 
  
4.2. Stage 1: Merger Formation  
In Section 4.1, we have introduced how firms compete in the domestic market with 
respect to each possible market structure. In this section, we will analyze how the trade 
cost level and the production cost differences in combination affect the owners’ merger 
decisions, which includes being a single competitive unit or participating in a merger 
(nationally or internationally).  
The framework of this model is basically developed in Horn and Persson (2001b). 
They supposed that in a minimal symmetric model, owners are free to communicate and 
enter into binding contracts with other owners. The merger formation process is always 
treated as a cooperative game of coalition formation. In order to illustrate the intelligibly 
determine the process of reaching an equilibrium ownership pattern, they employed two 
important concepts introduced in Horn and Persson (2001a): dominance relation and 
decisive group. Furthermore, their merger model is composed of three basic components: a 
specification and two criterions. The specification is about owners determining whether 
one structure dominates another one, and one criterion is used to determine when owners 
prefer the former structure to the latter, and another criterion is used to pick out 
equilibrium ownership structures on the basis of all pairwise dominance rankings for the 
merger formation game.  
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4.2.1. Decisive Groups 
In the first stage of interaction, decisive group choose a satisfactory ownership pattern 
for all parties who belong to this decisive group. Which owners should be involved in the 
decisive group? Horn and Persson (2001a) defined that owners who are involved in a 
“decisive group” should be expected to be able to exert influence between two structures 
and determine whether one dominates another one. This kind of relation between those two 
structures is named “dominance”. Similarly, Calmette (2008) identified “decisive owners” 
as “those who are not indifferent to alternative firm coalitions”. More specifically, a 
“decisive group” consists of owners who belonged to a coalition before or after a structural 
change and there is a link among them. Hence, we build a Decisive Groups table according 
to the description of decisive owners of Calmette. In some sense, all owners who 
participate in forming and disbanding coalitions between two structures prefer the 
dominative structure to the others. 
Due to the limit size of the table, we let    *   2  + represents all structures with 
only one international merger, and    *   2 +  represents all structures with two 
international mergers. Observing all pairs of market structures, we can find that there may 
exist one or two decisive groups. Concentrating on the situation with one decisive group, 
for instance, between the fully decentralized market structure    *  2    + and the 
domestic triopoly market structure    * 2    +, firm 3 and 4 do not affect whether the 
market structure will be changed from the former to the latter (or from the latter to the 
former), because they constantly stay away from any mergers. On the other hand, firm 1 
and 2 will prefer to form a coalition by moving from    to   , since the former market 
structure is dominated by latter, of which condition is two domestic firms should make 
sure that they could profit more from a national merger than from the decentralized market 
structure. Hence, we say that firm 1 and 2 are involved in the same decisive group, denoted 
by 𝑆   *  2+ (S is the acronym for “the set of decisive firms”), with respect to a 
dominance ranking between two market structures    and   . 
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Table 2: Decisive Groups 
 M
0
{1,2,3,4} M
I
{13,24} M
N
{12,34} M
T
{13,2,4} M
F
{1,2,34} 
M
D
{12,3,4} {1,2} {1,2,3,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {1,2} and {3,4} 
M
F
{1,2,34} {3,4} {1,2,3,4} {1,2} {1,3,4}  
M
T
{13,2,4} {1,3} {2,4} {1,2,3,4}   
M
N
{12,34} {1,2} and {3,4} {1,2,3,4}    
M
I
{13,24} {1,3} and {2,4}     
 
Now, turning to the situation with two decisive groups, for example, between the 
decentralized market structure    *  2    + and the national duopoly market structure 
   * 2   +, it is required that all firms prefer    to   . But there is no link between 
domestic and foreign firms. Further more, firm 1 may prefer to persuade firm 2 to merge 
with it nationally if it is adversely affected by market structure   .  Maybe firm 3 is also 
adversely affected by the structure   , and then it employs a similar strategy to suggest a 
national merger with firm 4. In these two negotiations, domestic and foreign firms will not 
interfere with each other, and, hence, there are two decisive groups, 𝑆 
   *  2+ and 
𝑆 
   *   +. Thus, we can generate two features for a dominance ranking with two 
decisive groups: (i) firms belong to different coalitions in the two structures; (ii) there is no 
link between two groups and they cannot transfer any resources between them. 
4.2.2. Dominance 
Having specified which owners should be involved in a decisive group, now we need 
to solve the question: when does a decisive group prefer one structure to another? Horn 
and Persson (2001a) show that this depends on the combined profit of a decisive group. So 
this question should be divided into two situations: one or two decisive groups. If there is 
only one decisive group, we can say that  𝑥 dominates  𝑦 if and only if the combined 
profit of the decisive group is larger in former structure than in latter. If there are two 
decisive groups, the dominance relation should be qualitatively similar for the two groups. 
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This implies that  𝑥 dominates  𝑦 only if two premises are simultaneously satisfied: 
the combined profit of decisive group 1 is larger in  𝑥 than in  𝑦, and the same is true 
for decisive group 2. Note that the dominance relation is not transitive. For instance, if  𝑥 
dominates  𝑦  and  𝑦  dominates  𝑧 , it cannot be automatically inferred that  𝑥 
dominates  𝑧. The reason is that decisive group(s) with respect to  𝑥 and  𝑦 may not 
identical with decisive group(s) of  𝑦 and  𝑧.  
 
4.2.3. Equilibrium Market Structure 
Having identified the decisive group(s) for each pair of market structures, and having 
also specified the criterion for dominance relation, the equilibrium market structure, if it 
exists, is defined as one that is undominated by any other feasible market structure. 
In the analysis of Calmette (2008), firms that participate in an international merger 
may be able to achieve two kinds of cost synergies: trade cost savings or production cost 
savings. In our model, in contrast, merged firms are also able to achieve synergies by a 
scale economies effect. In addition, firms compete only in the domestic market and exit 
from the market is not considered. The latter assumption implies that we restrict the 
parameter set to        , which enables us to make a relevant comparison between all 
the potential (feasible) market structures. 
The pattern of equilibrium market structures is characterized as follows: 
 
Proposition 3.   
(1) There exists an  𝑎, such that for  𝑎      , the EMS is an international duopoly 
(  ). The optimal choice of production strategy (TCS or SEE) for internationally 
firms depends on how the trade cost level compares to the production cost 
difference. The critical trade cost level, where internationally merged firms are 
indifferent between the two strategies is given by   . 
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(2) When       𝑏, the fully decentralized structure (  ) is the EMS. 
 
Figure 8 graphically summarizes the equilibrium market structures in the domestic 
market for the parameter set of (   ). By holding the production cost difference at a 
relatively low level (i.e., it locates in the left side of  𝑏), the international duopoly 
structure occurs if and only if the trade cost is at intermediate levels ( 𝑎      ̅). Note 
that    is the threshold line with respect to the international firms’ decisions on their 
production strategies. More specifically, if the trade cost level is higher than   , 
international firms will produce only in their domestic plants; otherwise, they prefer to 
keep productions at both domestic and foreign plants. However, if trade costs are lower 
than  𝑎 , no market structure is undominated and, therefore, no equilibrium market 
structure exists.  
 
 
Figure 8: Equilibrium Market Structures (EMSs) 
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In contrast, when holding the production cost difference at a relatively high level, 
which refers to the right side of  𝑏 , the equilibrium market structure remains the 
international duopoly if trade costs are sufficiently high; the fully decentralized structure 
dominates any other structures if the trade cost is relatively low; there is no equilibrium 
structure when the trade cost in intermediate levels.  
These results differ greatly from Calmette (2008), who found that in the case of low 
marginal cost of production, at least one national merger occurs in two countries when the 
trade cost is high and international mergers always occur when the trade cost is low; in the 
case of high marginal cost of production, foreign firms are able to induce domestic firms 
exit. What leads to these differences? First, we have modified two basic assumptions: firms 
compete in the single market (domestic) and trade costs do not start from prohibitive levels. 
Moreover, we implicitly assumed that firms incur diseconomies of scale. The combination 
all these modifications results in those distinct findings. 
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5. Trade Liberalization 
In this section we will analyze the effects of trade liberalization on merger incentives, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare in the following. 
 
5.1. Merger Incentives  
What is the merger incentive in the domestic market along with trade liberalization? In 
order to identify merger incentives for firms, both foreign and domestic, we will discuss 
firms’ profits across countries by fixing production cost differences at a certain given 
value.  
Figure 9a and 9b show profit consequences of domestic and foreign firms following 
liberalization at different levels of production cost differences. And the black line 
represents profits that are generated by a domestic plant, while the red line represents profit 
of a foreign plant. 
  
 
Figure 9a: Foreign and Domestic Owners’ Profits During Trade Liberalization (   .2) 
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Figure 9a: Foreign and Domestic Owners’ Profits During Trade Liberalization (   .7) 
 
Consider first Figure 9a, where the production cost difference is low. For the range 
(  ̅   ̅), international firms forego importing from their foreign plants and serve the 
domestic market by using domestic plants only. They will have a constant profit as a result 
of liberalization. However, domestic owners will not take the constant profit entirely. 
Because they need to share part of profit with foreign owners in order to keep their market 
power. 
At   below   , domestic firms will be unable to prevent foreign firms from entering 
the market. The best strategy for them is to merging internationally to reduce the 
competition of market. More specifically, domestic firms are the largest competitors for 
each other. The new entrants may to be their potential partners since they realize that the 
competitive threat from foreign firms is weak. On the other hand, the advantages from 
protective trade policies are not enough to offset the negative effects (which may involve 
losses in market share, reduction of profit, falling of price, or combination all of these) 
brought by new competitors. Moreover, the threat of competition from foreign firms still is 
able to undo the domestic national merger. Because domestic firms take almost all market 
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shares, the merger paradox will occur if they engage in a national merger. In terms of 
foreign firms, because of the relatively high trade cost, they need to decrease their 
disadvantage and reinforce competitiveness by persuading domestic firms to join 
international coalitions. So, forming international coalitions is the best option for all firms. 
To the left side of   , foreign firms are facing the upward tendency of profits. Their 
disadvantage is weakened following trade liberalization, but still distinct. So, 
internationally merging with a domestic firm remains to be the best strategy for them. 
Domestic firms’ profits show a downward tendency, which induces them to make effort to 
slow down the tendency. They can do this by the scale economies effect. 
Following trade liberalization, if    𝑎, neither domestic nor foreign firms hold any 
clear cost advantage and the market is unable to reach equilibrium. On the one hand, 
competition increases, which may induce firms (who hold a slight competitive advantage) 
to drop out of international coalitions. At this point, firms prefer to be decentralized 
regardless of the behavior of another country’s firms. For instance, if foreign firms decide 
to merge nationally, domestic firms are willing to stay out of a merger because they can 
benefit from the free-rider effect. If foreign firms change their decision to undo the 
national merger, domestic firms also remain to be decentralized because they need to 
prevent any losses due to the merger paradox. However, for both foreign and domestic 
sides, the gain from the fully decentralized structure is always less than the national 
duopoly structure. That is a classic prisoner’s dilemma problem. 
The market will remain in a no-equilibrium state until  𝑏. Figure 9b shows the profits 
during liberalization when production cost differences between two countries are high. The 
first two stages of trade liberalization show the same pattern compare to the low   case.  
As trade costs decrease below  𝑏, foreign firms hold an obvious cost advantage and 
are unwilling to merge internationally to share the benefits with domestic competitors. 
They also have less incentive to merge nationally, because there is an incentive to remain 
single units to enjoy benefits from free-rider effect for both sides, if firms from the same 
country believe that firms from another country may be involved in a national merger. 
UMINHO 2013 
 46 
Domestic firms, as the defensive side, the best strategy is to make great efforts to keep 
their market shares. Hence, the only way, which would meet desires of both sides, is 
decentralizing. 
Now we are able to summarize our results about merger formation during trade 
liberalization. Foreign firms have strong incentives to avoid high trade cost by 
internationally merging, by which way domestic firms will be able to profit from the 
decrease of market competition. However, along with trade liberalization, firms will run 
into a prisoner’s dilemma except if there is sufficiently large production cost differences 
between the two countries.  
 
5.2. Consumer Surplus 
According to the discussion above, we know that firstly firms’ behaviors in the 
industry are influenced by the degree of trade liberalization, and then the market structure 
may be changed, thereby consumer interests and social welfare will be affected. In this 
process, the effects of trade liberalization on consumer interests and social welfare are 
indirect. Here the indicator of consumer interests reflects the impacts of variations of 
market price and output (which resulting from mergers) on consumer interests. The 
indicator of social welfare is an overall evaluation index on various social effects of 
mergers. These two indicators are including: consumer surplus and domestic welfare. Note 
that in this thesis, firms only compete in the domestic market. Hence, the social welfare is 
defined as the sum of consumer surplus, aggregate profits earned by firms located at the 
domestic market, and some percent of total profits generated by international firms are 
received by domestic owners and are therefore part of domestic profits. 5  
First of all, let’s focus attention on the effects of trade liberalization on consumer 
surplus. The market price will be reduced in line with trade liberalization. We know that 
there is a direct link between consumer surplus and market price. If price decreases, the 
                                                        
5 Tariff revenue is excluded from the social welfare, because we do not explicitly define what the trade cost includes.  
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consumer surplus will increase sharply. 
By setting    .2, Figure 10a illustrates the consequences for consumer surplus and 
market price during trade liberalization. Apparently, when international firms only produce 
in their domestic plants both consumer surplus and market price will remain at a constant 
level. Because the domestic demand is completely supplied by domestic plants and the 
trade cost level is unable to exert influence to the market price.  
However, along with trade liberalization, international firms adjust their production 
strategy to restart their foreign plants according to their own-interest needs. At this moment, 
the price decreases with respect to the reduction of trade cost. Domestic consumers will 
enjoy the benefit from the lower price.  
Let us now turn to the case of high production cost differences (   .7), which is 
graphical illustrated in Figure 10b. In the first two stages of trade liberalization, both 
consumer surplus and market price show a similar pattern compared to Figure 10a, even 
though it is for a smaller range of trade cost. When the trade cost decreases below  𝑏, the 
degree of market competition is high, which can be measured by the price. Domestic 
consumers will gain from this.  
The above findings also partly confirm Calmette (2008)’s results about the evolution 
of competitiveness following trade liberalization. She also introduced the price to measure 
the degree of market competitiveness and identified discontinuities in the sense that the 
market price is not linear with respect to the trade cost level.  
 
 
Figure 10a: Consumer Surplus (CS) and Market Price at Different Stages of Trade Liberalization 
(   .2) 
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Figure 10b: Consumer Surplus and Market Price at Different Stages of Trade Liberalization (   .7) 
 
5.3. Welfare 
To explore the effects of trade liberalization on welfare, by holding the difference of 
production costs to be fixed, we compare the sum of consumer surplus and domestic firms’ 
profits at different stages of trade liberalization. The degree of production cost differences 
greatly influences domestic welfare consequences. If these differences are low, the 
high-cost country (domestic) firms are more competitive but an international merger may 
occur. On the other hand, when these differences are high, it is less attractive to produce in 
the domestic country.  
The domestic welfare consequences of trade liberalization are illustrated in Figure 11a 
and 11b, where the former figure shows the case of little difference between production 
costs (   .2) and the latter shows the case of huge difference (   .7).  
Consider first the case of low production cost differences. When the trade cost   is 
lower than   , the domestic market becomes more competitive. Regardless of which 
behaviors will be chosen by domestic firms, foreign firms are able to enter the market and 
enjoy positive profits. In order to hold on to market shares, the best strategy for domestic 
firms is to merge internationally. On the other hand, there is an incentive to avoid the high 
trade cost for foreign firms. They can do this by merging internationally with a domestic 
firm. Because the domestic demand is supplied by domestic plants only, the trade 
liberalization is unable to influence the domestic welfare, which remains in a fixed level. 
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Figure 11a: Domestic Welfare at Different Stages of Trade Liberalization (   .2) 
 
 
Figure 11b: Domestic Welfare at Different Stages of Trade Liberalization (   .7) 
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In Figure 8,    is the boundary in where international firms are indifferent between 
the strategies of TCS and SEE. When   is below   , the SEE is the preferred strategy. 
Therefore, as a result of trade liberalization, international firms tend to rearrange part of 
production to their foreign plants, which leads to the decline of domestic plants’ outputs. It 
follows that the domestic producer surplus decreases. Although there is an increase in 
consumer surplus, the increment is still less than the reduction of the domestic producer 
surplus, so the domestic welfare decreases. 
Turning to the case of a high production cost difference,    .7, the domestic 
welfare consequences are illustrated in the Figure 11b. Starting from      again, the 
first two degrees of trade liberalization present the similar pattern of domestic welfare 
effects as discussed above. However, foreign firms are able to enter the market at a higher 
trade cost level relative to the low   case, and the effective regions of those EMSs are 
narrower. As the trade liberalization goes on, the fully decentralized structure    appears 
as the EMS after   reaches  𝑏. Firms will take part in the competition of the domestic 
market by competing as single units because they are all in preference to enjoy the 
free-rider effect. The domestic producer surplus increases and will be less sensitive6 with 
respect to trade liberalization as long as   is higher than   . The domestic consumer 
surplus shows a similar tendency. The combination of these two increments induces the 
domestic welfare jumps. 
Obviously, firms consider more on their own interests when making decision on their 
behavior. This suggests a question: whether the EMSs found above are the most preferred 
ones in the point of view of social welfare? The most preferred market structures, with 
respect to different values of   and  , are illustrated in Figure 12. For the third stage of 
trade liberalization ( 𝑦     𝑥), the maximal domestic welfare arises after foreign firms 
broke down their international coalition to engage in a national merger (  ). Figure 8, 
                                                        
6 To explore how the change in trade cost affects the change in producer surplus (or consumer surplus), given  , we can 
evaluates the trade cost elasticity of producer surplus (or consumer surplus). The detailed calculations are shown in the 
Appendix. 
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however, shows that the preferred structure for firms is not the foreign triopoly structure 
but the one with two international mergers.  
When  𝑎     𝑦 , firms prefer the duopoly with two international mergers, in 
contrast to the socially preferred one, which is the structure   . During liberalization in 
this range, the difference between   and   decreases, and the domestic market becomes 
more and more competitive. From the social point, the more competitive market the better. 
In contrast, firms merge all the way to grab as many market shares as possible. That is the 
most conflict between private and public.  
Since the values of (   ) at the medium level (i.e., that  𝑏     𝑎), firms run into 
a prisoner’s dilemma problem (i.e., no structure is able to dominate all the others). In 
contrast, the socially optimal structure remains the fully decentralized. 
Although there are situations where firms’ preferred structure contrasts with the 
socially optimal one, there also exist situations where the privately and socially preferred 
structures coincide. For instance, in the extreme (far-right sides of Figure 8 and 12), when 
the difference of production costs between two countries is sufficiently large, the EMS is 
  , corresponding to the socially preferred one. 
The above analysis might also give some guidelines with respect to antitrust policy. In 
general, since the socially preferred structures do not always correspond to the equilibrium 
market structures, there is scope for authorities to issue welfare-enhancing anti-trust 
policies. For example, when the trade cost level is close to the difference in production 
costs between two countries, the socially preferred structure may is   . An optimal policy 
might then be to forbid national mergers, which might induce firms to choose the fully 
decentralized structure.  
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Figure 12: The Most Preferred Structures From a Welfare Point of View 
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6. Conclusion 
Following the development of economic globalization in the world, more and more 
international mergers arise in economic hotspots, such as Europe, Asia, and America. 
International merger has been one of the most popular investment vehicles. The effects of 
trade liberalization on merger incentives have become a hotspot in economics.  
In this thesis, first we have shown the effects of trade liberalization on market 
structures by assuming that countries have different cost disadvantages and all firms 
compete in the single market (domestic). We find that trade liberalization may lead to 
increments of competition regardless of the differences in production costs between two 
countries. We also find that the fully decentralized structure arises only if foreign firms 
hold some competitive advantages: comparatively high production cost difference between 
countries. International mergers arise only if domestic firms hold some competitive 
advantages: comparatively high trade costs. The welfare analysis helps us to understand 
the consequences of trade liberalization. We find that private interests do not always 
coincide with social interests. 
Therefore, from the long-term development perspective of a firm, the best option is to 
make an effective strategy to adapt to changes in external environments and try hard to 
make own interests coincides with interests of consumers and society. In terms of social 
welfare, governments should formulate policies on the premise of protecting the domestic 
consumers’ interests, such as reducing the production difference with other countries by 
issuing more generous tax laws, creating a more deregulated business environment, 
encouraging technical innovation, improving quality of labor, cutting down financing costs 
of firms, moderately lowing tariff levels and easing quota control and so on.  
In this thesis we sketchily describe the effects of trade liberalization on merger 
incentives and social welfare. The deeper investigation on merger incentives of trade 
liberalization is expected and we will continue to work in this field in the near future. 
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7. Appendix 
The supporting calculations and proofs not provided in earlier sections are given in 
this section. 
 
7.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
From the discussion above we can find that the internationally merged firm produces 
at both plants (i.e., that their outputs are non-negative) if 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5. Due to the scale 
economies effect, the optimal strategy for the merged firm is to keep productions at both 
plants. We assume first that 𝑓 < 𝑓5. This implies that the internationally merged firm’s 
domestic plant has a negative output. The best strategy for the merged firm is to shut down 
the negative-output plant and produce only at the foreign plant (“production cost savings”). 
By solving the equilibrium problem, both domestic firm and the merged firm have 
non-negative outputs if 𝑓 < 𝑓1 and 𝑓 > 𝑓3. The first inequality always holds for 𝑓 < 𝑓5 
(since 𝑓5 > 𝑓1), while the second one places the lower limit on 𝑓. Thus, we can conclude 
that the “production cost savings” arises for 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5. 
On the other hand, if we suppose that 𝑓 > 𝑓5, output of the merged firm’s foreign 
plant will be negative. The best solution is to produce only at the domestic plant. Still by 
solving the equilibrium problem, outputs (both foreign and internationally merged firm) 
are non-negative if 𝑓 < 𝑓3 and 𝑓 > 𝑓1. The first inequality places the upper limit on 𝑓, 
while the second one always holds for 𝑓 > 𝑓5 (since 𝑓5 < 𝑓1). Thus, we can conclude 
that the “trade cost savings” occurs for 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
Hence, we can summarize the equilibrium outcomes in this market structure as: 
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𝑞𝑚
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
18
(3 + 𝑑 − 4𝑓),  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5
1
18
(3 − 4𝑑 +  𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3  
1
26
(6 − 3𝑑 − 3𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5
                                 (7-1) 
𝑞2
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
18
(3 − 5𝑑 + 2𝑓),  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
18
(3 − 4𝑑 + 𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
78
(12 − 19𝑑 + 7𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                               (7-2) 
𝑞4
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
18
(3 + 𝑑 − 4𝑓),  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
18
(3 + 2𝑑 − 5𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
78
(12 + 7𝑑 − 19𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                               (7-3) 
𝑃𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
6
(3 + 𝑑 + 2𝑓),  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
6
(3 + 2𝑑 + 𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
26
(12 + 7𝑑 + 7𝑓), 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                                (7-4) 
𝜋𝑚
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
162
(3 + 𝑑 − 4𝑓)2,  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
162
(3 − 4𝑑 + 𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
676
[27(𝑑 − 1)2 + 27(𝑓 − 1)2 + 71(𝑑 − 𝑓)2], 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
         (7-5) 
𝜋2
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
162
(3 − 5𝑑 + 2𝑓)2,  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
162
(3 − 4𝑑 + 𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
3042
(12 − 19𝑑 + 7𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                            (7-6) 
𝜋4
𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
162
(3 + 𝑑 − 4𝑓)2,  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
162
(3 + 2𝑑 − 5𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
3042
(12 + 7𝑑 − 19𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                            (7-7) 
𝐶𝑆𝑇 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
72
(3 − 𝑑 − 2𝑓)2,  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
72
(3 − 2𝑑 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
49
1352
(2 − 𝑑 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
                               (7-8) 
𝐷𝑊𝑇 = 
{
 
 
 
 
1
648
[87(𝑑 − 1)2 + 30(𝑓 − 1)2 + 22(𝑑 − 𝑓)2],  𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5   
1
648
[150(𝑑 − 1)2 + 3(𝑓 − 1)2 + 14(𝑑 − 𝑓)2], 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3 
1
12168
[2739(𝑑 − 1)2 + 87(𝑓 − 1)2 + 730(𝑑 − 𝑓)2], 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓5.
      (7-9) 
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7.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
In line with the logic of section 5.1, the best strategy for internationally merged firms 
is to produce at both (foreign and domestic) plants if 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. However, if 𝑓 < 𝑓4, 
which signifies that domestic plants’ outputs are negative, the equilibrium is a corner 
solution where merged firms produce only at foreign plants (“production cost savings”). 
Conversely, if 𝑓 > 𝑓4, which implies that outputs of foreign plants are negative, the 
equilibrium is another corner solution where merged firms produce only at domestic plants 
(“trade cost savings”). In either corner solutions we find that outputs are non-negative for 
all 𝑓 ∈  (0,1) or 𝑑 ∈  (0,1). Thus we can conclude that the “scale economies effect” 
occurs for 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4; the “production cost savings” occurs for 𝑓 < 𝑓4; the “trade cost 
savings” occurs for 𝑓 > 𝑓4. 
Thus, we can sum up the equilibrium outcomes in this market structure as follows: 
𝑞𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
5
(1 − 𝑓), 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
1
5
(1 − 𝑑), 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
8
(2 − 𝑑 − 𝑓), 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4;
                                     (7-10) 
𝑃𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
1
5
(3 + 2𝑓), 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
1
5
(3 + 2𝑑), 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
4
(2 + 𝑑 + 𝑓), 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4;
                                     (7-11) 
𝑄𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
2
5
(1 − 𝑓), 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
2
5
(1 − 𝑑), 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
4
(2 − 𝑑 − 𝑓), 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4;
                                     (7-12) 
𝜋𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
2
25
(1 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
2
25
(1 − 𝑑)2, 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
128
[6(𝑑 − 1)2 + 6(𝑓 − 1)2 + 13(𝑑 − 𝑓)2], 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4;
             (7-13) 
𝐶𝑆𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
2
25
(1 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
2
25
(1 − 𝑑)2, 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
32
(2 − 𝑑 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4;
                                  (7-14) 
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𝐷𝑊𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
2
25
(1 − 𝑓)2, 𝑓 < 𝑓4;   
6
25
(1 − 𝑑)2, 𝑓 > 𝑓4;
1
128
[30(𝑑 − 1)2 − 2(𝑓 − 1)2 + 9(𝑑 − 𝑓)2], 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4.
           (7-15) 
 
7.3. Proof of Proposition 3 
Because of differences of feasible regions of possible market structures, it suffices to 
show which structure dominates another structure in the respectively range of (𝑑, 𝑓). 
(i) Consider now the range 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3, where all firms are surviving. In this region, 
the best production strategy for firms, which be involved in an international merger, 
is TCS. Because the trade cost is sufficiently high compare to the difference of 
production costs. Firstly, to explore the conditions of 𝑀𝐼𝑑 dominates all the other 
structures: 
(1) One decisive group {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼𝑑 dominates 𝑀𝑇𝑑 for all 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
(2) One decisive group {1, 2, 3, 4}: 𝑀𝐼𝑑 dominates 𝑀𝑁 for all 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
And dominates 𝑀𝐷 for all 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
And dominates 𝑀𝐹 for all 𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
(3) Two decisive groups {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼𝑑 dominates 𝑀0 for all 𝑓4 < 𝑓 <
𝑓3. 
It is straightforward to see that 𝑀𝐼𝑑 dominates all the other structures for all 
𝑓4 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. 
(ii) When 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4 , the optimal choice of production strategy for international 
firms, depends on the market structure. In the international duopoly, the merged 
firms change their production strategy from TCS to SEE. However, the merged 
firm in the international triopoly remains to take TCS to avoid the trade cost. To 
evaluate the dominance relation as follows: 
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(1) One decisive group {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼 dominates 𝑀𝑇𝑑 for all 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. 
(2) One decisive group {1, 2, 3, 4}: 𝑀𝐼 dominates 𝑀𝑁 for all 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. 
And dominates 𝑀𝐷 for all 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. 
And dominates 𝑀𝐹 for all 𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. 
(3) Two decisive groups {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼 dominates 𝑀0 for all 𝑓5 < 𝑓 <
𝑓4. 
It is straightforward to see that 𝑀𝐼 dominates all the other structures for all 
𝑓5 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4. And note that 𝑓4 is the line where internationally merged firms 
(which arise in the international duopoly structure) are indifferent between TCS 
and SEE. 
(iii) With the development of trade liberalization 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 , and the increment of 
difference between production costs but not too larger over than 𝑓5 , the 
internationally merged firm in the international triopoly also achieves an incentive 
to move their production strategy to SEE to enjoy more combined profits. In the 
range 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5, dominance relation are as follows: 
(1) One decisive group {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼 dominates 𝑀𝑇 if 
𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 <
;90:2749𝑑
2659
−
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
  
or   
;90:2749𝑑
2659
+
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
< 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 
(2) One decisive group {1, 2, 3, 4}: 𝑀𝐼 dominates 𝑀𝐹 and 𝑀𝐷 for all 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 ≤
𝑓5 
And dominates 𝑀𝑁 if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑑 or 𝑑 < 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 
(3) Two decisive groups {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀𝐼  dominates 𝑀0  if 5034;613𝑑
4421
−
168√1005(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
4421
< 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5. 
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Note that for all 𝑑 ∈  (0, 1) , 
;90:2749𝑑
2659
+
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
>
5034;613𝑑
4421
−
168√1005(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
4421
> 𝑑 >
;90:2749𝑑
2659
−
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
. It results that 𝑀𝐼 
dominates all the other structures if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5  for 𝑓 > 𝑓𝑎 , where 𝑓𝑎 =
;90:2749𝑑
2659
+
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
. In Proposition 3, we have specified that structures 
with national merger will never be the EMS for the range 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓3. Thus, there 
are two remaining possible market structures 𝑀𝑇 and 𝑀0. 
(4) One decisive group {2, 4}: 𝑀𝑇  dominates 𝑀𝐼  if          ;90:2749𝑑
2659
−
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
< 𝑓 <
;90:2749𝑑
2659
+
312√5(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
2659
 
(5) One decisive group {1, 3}: 𝑀𝑇  dominates 𝑀0  if 
28653;4271𝑑
24382
−
819√1205(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
24382
< 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 
(6) One decisive group {1, 2, 3}: 𝑀𝑇 dominates 𝑀𝐹 if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑑 or 
1
91
(33 +
58𝑑) < 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5  
(7) One decisive group {1, 3, 4}: 𝑀𝑇  dominates 𝑀𝐷  if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 <
1
58
(−33 +
91𝑑) or 𝑑 < 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 
(8) One decisive group {1, 2, 3, 4}: 𝑀𝑇 is dominated by 𝑀𝑁 completely. 
It is straightforward to see that 𝑀𝑇 does not dominate all the other structures. 
(9) One decisive group {1, 3}: 𝑀0  dominates 𝑀𝑇  if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 <
28653;4271𝑑
24382
−
819√1205(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
24382
 
(10) One decisive group {1, 2}: 𝑀0  dominates 𝑀𝐷  if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 <
14109:145𝑑
14254
−
5733√6(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
14254
 
(11) One decisive group {3, 4}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐹 for all 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5 
(12) Two decisive group {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀0  dominates 𝑀𝐼  if 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 <
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5034;613𝑑
4421
−
168√1005(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
4421
 
(13) Two decisive group {1, 2} and {3, 4}: 𝑀0 is dominated by 𝑀𝑁 completely. 
Hence, we can summarize that in the range 𝑓5 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓5, the only EMS is 𝑀
𝐼𝑑 
for 𝑓 > 𝑓𝑎. 
(iv) In the range of 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5, the merged firm in the international triopoly have an 
incentive to change their production strategy to PCS to earn highest combined 
profits. Then to explore the dominance relation as follows: 
(1) One decisive group {1, 3}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝑇 for all 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5; 
(2) One decisive group {1, 2}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐷 for all 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5; 
(3) One decisive group {3, 4}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐹 for all 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5; 
(4) Two decisive groups {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐼𝑓 for all 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 <
𝑓5. 
(5) Two decisive groups {1, 2} and {3, 4}: 𝑀0  is dominated by 𝑀𝑁  for all 
𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5. However, the structure 𝑀
𝑁 is not able to dominate all the other 
structures. It has been verified in Proposition 3. 
It follows that there is no EMS for all 𝑓4 ≤ 𝑓 < 𝑓5. 
(v) When 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4, the internationally merged firms in the international duopoly 
also find an incentive to alert their production strategy to PCS strategy. To explore 
conditions of 𝑀0 dominates all the other structures as follows: 
(1) One decisive group {1, 3}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝑇𝑓 for all 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4; 
(2) One decisive group {1, 2}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐷 for all 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4; 
(3) One decisive group {3, 4}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐹 for all 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4; 
(4) Two decisive groups {1, 3} and {2, 4}: 𝑀0 dominates 𝑀𝐼𝑓 for all 𝑓3 < 𝑓 <
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𝑓4. 
(5) Two decisive groups {1, 2} and {3, 4}: 𝑀0  dominates 𝑀𝑁  if 𝑓 <
;258:1151𝑑
893
−
336√6(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
893
 
It results that in the range 𝑓3 < 𝑓 < 𝑓4, 𝑀
0 dominates all the other structures for 
𝑓 < 𝑓𝑏, where 𝑓𝑏 =
;258:1151𝑑
893
−
336√6(1;2𝑑:𝑑2)
893
. And for 𝑓 > 𝑓𝑏 , there is no 
equilibrium market structure existing. 
 
7.4. Elasticity 
Given elasticity function as: 
 
𝐸𝑓,𝑘
𝑖 =
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝑓
∗
𝑓
𝑘
                                                (7-16) 
 
Where 𝑖 = 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑘 = Cs (consumer surplus) or Ps (domestic producer surplus). 
(i) Given 𝑑 = 0.2: 
a) For 13
25
< 𝑓 <
27
25
, 𝐸𝑓,𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑑 = 0  and 𝐸𝑓,𝐶𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑑 = 0 , in this range of 𝑓 , both 
consumers surplus and producer surplus are indifferent to the variation of 
trade liberalization. 
b) For 2299:1248√5
13295
< 𝑓 ≤
13
25
: 
𝜕𝑃𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
14.8:6𝑓
128
> 0, which implies that the producer surplus is on the rise with 
respect to 𝑓;  
𝐸𝑓,𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼 = 2 −
4.6
𝑓:4.6
−
1
3𝑓:1
> 0.  
And 
𝜕𝐶𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
;1.8:𝑓
16
< 0 , which implies that the consumer surplus is in a 
downtrend with respect to the trade cost;  
𝐸𝑓,𝐶𝑠
𝑀𝐼 = 2 −
3.6
1.8;𝑓
< −1. 
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(ii) Given 𝑑 = 0.7: 
a) For 41
50
< 𝑓 <
22
25
: 𝐸𝑓,𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑑 = 0 and 𝐸𝑓,𝐶𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑑 = 0; 
b) For 19153:936√5
26590
< 𝑓 ≤
41
50
: 
𝜕𝑃𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
1.8:6𝑓
128
> 0, 𝐸𝑓,𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼 = 2 + (
1
2𝑓;1
−
1.1
𝑓:1.1
) > 2;  
And 
𝜕𝐶𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
;1.3:𝑓
16
< 0, 𝐸𝑓,𝐶𝑠
𝑀𝐼 = 2 −
2.6
1.3;𝑓
< −1; 
c) For 1
4
< 𝑓 <
5477;1008√6
8930
:  
𝜕𝑃𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
;8(1;2𝑓)
441
< 0, 𝐸𝑓,𝑃𝑠
𝑀0 = 2 −
1.76
0.88;𝑓
< 0 
And 
𝜕𝐶𝑠
𝜕𝑓
=
4
49
(−1.3 + 𝑓) < 0, 𝐸𝑓,𝐶𝑠
𝑀0 = 2 −
2.6
1.3;𝑓
< −1. 
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